《化妆师苏瑞的直播升聪明》

在美颜界，化妆师苏瑞是一位不懈追求完美、创意丰富的专家。自从2008年首次出现于公开场合直到今天，苏瑞也就像一位风流的娱乐主演一样受爱好者广泛喜爱和讨论。在她的个人资料网站“苏瑞资料”中，不仅可以深入了解她的成长故事、就业经历和日常生活，同时也能获取到准确并最新的个人信息。

首先，我们来看一下苏瑞在化妆师资格认证上的成就。2003年，在美国获得了“美国化妆师执业保健卫生法专业须知”（Cosmetology License），并在美国某州申请了“美国美容学校成绩认证”（Licensed Esthetician）。这些认证不仅说明了她的专业能力，也显示出苏瑞对个人发展和职业生涯有着无比热忱和精心打磨。

接下来，关于苏瑞的个人资料网站“苏瑞资料”。该网站是一处由苏瑞自行携带和管理的平台，为公众提� Written as part of a 2017 course on the history and philosophy of social science (Course syllabus here)

The nature of scientific knowledge in general is that it’s provisional. New evidence or new discoveries will overturn previous conclusions, so that our understanding of what we thought we knew previously needs to be updated accordingly. But how does this work for social sciences? The ‘social world’ seems much less easily revised than the physical world of chemistry and physics, but is it really true to say that in the field of sociology or psychology knowledge isn’t provisional after all (even if some scholars don’t like using this phrase)?

I would argue that even though there are obvious differences between the social sciences and the natural sciences, we shouldn’t be so quick to dismiss the notion of science as provisional in the social world. Of course, I am aware that many sociologists will argue against this point – for example by saying that it is not possible to do controlled experiments with humans or because there are too many variables affecting human behaviour and society (the ‘naturalist fallacy’). But even if we can never have absolute knowledge about the social world, does that mean it’s always fixed? Or at least subject to revision?

I would argue that sociology is provisional in much the same way as physics or chemistry – though maybe not quite so clear cut. Take this example of a discovery made by Thomas Kuhn (in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1962) which was instrumental in establishing paradigm theory for science. For years, physicists believed the Earth was at the centre of the universe, and that planets revolved around it according to perfectly circular orbits – this is referred to as ‘the Ptolemaic system’ (after Claudius Ptolemy, who put forward an early version). Then in 1543, Copernicus published his De revolutionibus orbium coelestium. It was the first time that anyone had tried to explain planetary motion without referring to Earth at the centre – he called this ‘the heliocentric model’ (‘helio-’ meaning sun and ‘-centric’ meaning with the sun in the middle). The Copernican Revolution is often taken as an example of paradigm change. But it took until 1609 for Galileo to confirm that Copernicus was right, using his telescope – he also found other evidence which supported the heliocentric model: mountains and craters on the Moon; phases of Venus and a ring around Saturn (a ‘planet’ previously known as ‘the Ring of Saturn’).

There have been numerous paradigm shifts in sociology over the years. For example, during the 18th-century Enlightenment many scholars began to use empirical data and research methods rather than just religious or moral arguments (or authority figures) – this is sometimes called ‘the birth of positivism’. It was a time when scientific knowledge really became central in society.

But then, during the 20th century with new theoretical paradigms such as Marxism and feminist theory, many scholars began to criticise those earlier ideas about how we can study social science empirically. For example, positivists believed that all problems could be solved through logical deduction or inductive reasoning from observational data – but for a lot of sociologists this wasn’t sufficient since it couldn’t explain the reasons why people behaved differently in different contexts (or even how social structure actually influenced individual behaviour). In other words, there was not enough ‘depth’ to these ideas.

So perhaps we can say that knowledge is provisional within the field of sociology – though just like with physics and chemistry it would need further confirmation before changing a paradigm (even if some scholars don’t like using this phrase). It seems as though there may be an underlying philosophy behind Kuhn's concept of the scientific revolution, which could also apply to social sciences. He argues that science works in such a way because scientists have certain mindsets and ways of looking at problems – it is almost ‘culture’ specific (or paradigmatic). But perhaps this culture/paradigm can be changed through new knowledge or even the discovery of something new, but only once enough evidence has been gathered to convince a significant proportion of those involved in that scientific community.

Of course Kuhn does not say explicitly how much evidence is required for such revolutionary change – although it’s usually implied that this would be substantial. But perhaps in some instances the need for proof could also come from philosophical or theoretical work, as well as empirical research. As a social scientist myself (although I haven't really studied anything about sociology) I find Kuhn's idea of provisional scientific knowledge quite useful – and interesting too – since it makes me feel like there is always something new to learn in the field even though we may not be able to prove every single thing definitively.

If you would like any feedback on this piece, please do get in touch via my email: rnichol@fibracc.co.uk